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A BILL AFFECTING PAROLE IN ILLINOIS:
THE GOVERNOR'S VETO'
HENRY HORNER, GOVERNOR

Pursuant to section 16 of Article V of the Constitution of
Illinois, I veto and herewith file in your office House Bill No. 382,
entitled "An Act to amend Sections 2, 3 and 7 of 'An Act to revise
the law in relation to the sentence and commitment of persons convicted of crime or offenses and providing for a system of parole and
to repeal certain Acts and parts of Acts therein named,' approved
June 25, 1917, as amended," together with my objection to the
same, and the reasons for which I have vetoed this bill.
This bill in its final form as passed by the General Assembly,
chiefly requires every trial court in criminal proceedings to fix the
minimum and maximum sentence of imprisonment (in all cases
except treason, murder, rape and kidnapping), the same as or
within the minimum and maximum terms fixed by the indeterminate sentence law for the particular offense. In other words, under
this bill the trial judge would be authorized to fix a minimum
greater than the minimum provided by law and a maximum less
than the maximum fixed by statute for the particular offense. This
would practically nullify the indeterminate sentence law.
House Bill No. 381 which proposed a similar change in the
present parole law and was limited to that very purpose was defeated in the House of Representatives.
The history of House Bill No. 382, during its legislative consideration is somewhat unusual. As originally introduced in the
House of Representatives and passed by it, House Bill No. 382
amended sections 6 and 7 of the parole law for the sole purpose of
prohibiting the State Parole Board, from questioning the indictment
or other charge of crime or the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. As a matter of practice, the Parole Board has
not for years, questioned the indictment or the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence. This bill as passed by the House also reaffirmed the law, which has been on the statute books for more than
a decade, requiring the trial judge and state's attorney to furnish
the Parole Board a statement of the facts and circumstances coni Addressed to the Honorable, The Secretary of State, July 10, 1937.
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stituting the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and all
other information accessible to them, regarding the prior career of
the prisoner, his habits, associates, disposition and reputation and
any other circumstances which might tend to throw light upon the
question as to whether the prisoner is capable of becoming a law
abiding citizen.
With both of these provisions of House Bill 382 as passed by
the House, I am in hearty accord. The Parole Board never was
intended to sit as a court of review upon the merits of a judgment
of guilty in a criminal case, and any attempt to do so would be a
usurpation of judicial functions. There can be no objection whatever to a provision requiring that all relevant information concerning the crime, be furnished the Board to assist it in the proper discharge of the duties required of it by law. Had House Bill No.
382, as originally passed by the House, limited to purposes I have
just stated, been adopted by the legislature, I would have approved
it without hesitation. However, as finally enacted after amendment
by the Senate, House Bill No. 382 shows a decided change. By
Senate amendments, Section 6 was entirely eliminated and in its
place appeared amendments to other sections, namely 2 and 3 of the
parole act, containing the identical provisions of House Bill No. 381
which the House of Representatives had repudiated by its defeat of
that bill. In these sections 2 and 3 occur the changes permitting
courts to fix the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment
within the limits prescribed by the law for the particular offense.
After this amendment to sections 2 and 3 was tacked on House Bill
382, by the Senate, the bill was sent back to the House, and on
being read once there, the amendment was concurred in. This
legislative procedure introduces a constitutional question as to the
validity of this bill.
The constitution of Illinois requires in section 13 of Article IV
that "Every bill shall be read at large three different days in each
house, .

.

."

The Supreme Court of this State has ruled that this

provision does not require the reading three times of amendments
to bills, provided that the amendments were all germane to the act.
Of the original House Bill 382 as introduced in the House of
Representatives, nothing remains except a minor provision that the
Parole Board shall not pass upon the sufficiency of an indictment
or the evidence to determine the propriety of a conviction-which
whether or not expressly stated in the statutes, unquestionably is
now the law, and is the practice of the Board.

HENRY HORNER

The Senate, after House Bill No. 382 passed the House of
Representatives, thus introduced by amendment, a definite change
of our parole system. The jurisdiction of courts in imposing sentences was greatly enlarged. The Senate amendments entirely
changing House Bill No. 382, were not read three times in the
House. It may well be that the above quoted rule laid down by our
Supreme Court, if applied to House Bill 382, would render it invalid. To run the risk of the constitutionality of such legislative
procedure might hazard the incarceration of those prisoners sentenced under such a law.
The Attorney General did not pass upon the objections as to
the legislative procedure which I have above mentioned. He did,
however, advise me that other objections to the constitutionality of
the bill, which were urged by opponents to it, were, in his opinion,
not well taken.
I have heretofore discussed the questions of legality in connection with House Bill No. 382 because I have considered them.
However, my veto of this bill is based, not upon its possible illegality, but upon my definite disapproval of its provisions. The views
of many others in this State and Nation who are familiar with and
have made an intensive study of the subject of criminal penalties
are in agreement with my view in this respect.
For more than forty years, this State has incorporated in its
system of crimindl penalties, an indeterminate sentence law and a
parole system, i. e., that the sentence for crimes be for an indeterminate period with release from incarceration from our penal
institutions, upon the order of a State department other than the
courts and supervision of the released person for a considerable
period of time.
House Bill No. 382 leaves it to the option of any trial judge to
make ineffective and inoperative the indeterminate sentence and
the parole law. This bill does not even establish a uniform system
of punishment throughout the State. One trial judge may decide
that the parole system is desirable and continue the imposition of
sentences for not less than the minimum term nor more than the
maximum term provided by law for the particular crime. Another
judge, under this bill, might impose practically determinate sentences in every case, taking from the Parole Board any discretion
as to when a convicted person may properly be returned or denied
a return to a place in society.
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Under this bill the trial judge might fix a maximum sentence
of one day in excess of the minimum sentence, thus releasing the
prisoner without any supervision after he leaves the penitentiary.
A court sentence of 6 years minimum to 9 years maximum might
be imposed under this bill, which would, with "good time," allowed

by law, earned from the maximum sentence result not in parole,
but in absolute discharge at the expiration of six years. If the
legislature, or the proponents of this bill, desire a repeal of the
indeterminate sentence act and the abolition of our parole system,
they should frankly say so. But the repeal of the parole system
and the return to definite sentences, if deemed advisable, should
be general and not left to the varying opinion of each of the, many
trial judges throughout the State.
Personally, I am opposed to the repeal of the parole system
piece-meal or in toto. Notwithstanding the hue and cry of the
moment it has proved its worth throughout our Nation. In ancient
times, the theory of punishment was the revenge which society imposed for offenses against it. To this principle has been added in
modern times a more practical and humane viewpoint, and we have
incorporated into our penal system two other ideas, viz., that punishment should be imposed as a deterrent to other wrong-doers and,
when possible, should seek to restore the offender as a useful and
law-abiding member of society. Mankind's aim has been to act
understandingly and progressively on this subject. House Bill 382
is a step backward.
Progress on the subject of penology demands two accomplishments in the treatment of offenders. First, that the prisoner is
straightforwardly punished in accordance with the sentence imposed upon him for having committed the crime and that he knows
this will follow his offense. Society is always entitled to that protection. Second, that, so far as the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation, the State ought to do what it can to fit him to resume his
status as one of its members.
Each of these objectives presents a great problem. We all
realize that it is sometimes difficult and in many cases impossible to
turn men toward the law who have turned against it. All prisoners, except those sentenced for life as habitual criminals, are eligible
for possible release at some time and some constituted authority
must determine if and when that time for release has come. Seldom
can the trial judge, however painstaking, determine, except by guess
work, when the prisoner is sufficiently punished or when he will be
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a fit person to be restored to society. It is the present record in
Illinois that over eighty-five per cent of all parolees make good.
Would you deny the more than eighty-five per cent who make good,
an opportunity to go straight because a minority of less than fifteen
per cent are incapable of rehabilitation or refuse to make good?
No phase of governmental administration in the modern state
is more difficult or requires more concentrated effort to see things
clearly and to think about them reasonably than parole. The success of a parole system depends not only upon its administration
but upon reasonable and informed public opinion. I would be less
than candid if I did not say that in the parole program we do not
rely greatly upon the prospect of "reforming" the professional lawbreaker.
Effective parole makes it very plain to the prisoner that when
he is released it is to his self-interest to go straight. Under determinate sentences he would be turned loose, at the prison gates
a free agent, without supervision, to choose his course of future
action upon the unregulated, unguided reasoning of his years in
prison. It would be the unusual if he turned to anything other than
the environment which would help to make him again an offender.
Under parole if he behaves properly, if he works, if he goes straight,
if he does not again violate the law or his parole agreement, he can
keep out of the penitentiary. But any infraction of his parole agreement or any offense against the law makes him subject to be summarily returned to the penitentiary, without the expense incident to
indictment, trial and conviction, appeal, and the long delays which
have become a part of the enforcement of criminal laws.
I am not unmindful of recent criticism encouraged by some
newspapers directed against the whole system of indeterminate sentences and discharge under parole. The press tells the public only
of the paroled convict who goes wrong. Rarely is credit given for
the vast majority of parolees who make good. They have dwelt
upon instances of new crimes committed by parolees until there is
a general, although unjust, impression that men of strong criminalistic tendencies are being released by our board of parolees as
a frequent occurrence.
The proceedings and results of any good parole board, administered in a non-partisan spirit by men sustained in their independence, will answer such misconceptions conclusively. I repeat
here what I said in my message to the legislature on January 11th
last:
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"True, mistakes of judgment by parole boards inevitably occur.
Errors occur also occasionally in our judicial system but that is no
justification for attacks generally upon our courts. I do not mean
to say to you that our parole law is beyond improvement. There
is much room for improvement of effective agencies for parole
administration. No perfect system has yet been discovered for
dealing with crime and criminals. We ought to have open minds
always, ready to study and act upon all constructive suggestions that
have for their purpose not only justice to offenders but also the
protection of society. We should gladly welcome any changes in
our laws which will improve our system of penology, yet I caution
you against making any changes in our laws, under the hue and
cry of the moment, which will deny to those who are worthy of it
a fair chance for rehabilitation."
The suggestions of House Bill No. 382 are not, in my judgment,
constructive.
Despite faults in administration, the record shows that the
parole plan has contributed more toward the security of society
than the fixed sentences that preceded it in the law of this State.
In our State the administration of the present Board of Pardons
and Paroles reveals that from January 1, 1933, to January 1, 1937,
the total of parolees returned under new sentences in four years
was only 4.46 per cent of those paroled during that time.
Parole is not leniency. It is not usually a remission of a sentence but is rather an extension of control; it is an "indispensable
bridge" between the life the prisoner has lived without personal
responsibility within prison walls and the normal law-abiding life
with all its responsibilities he is to live outside.
No trial judge, no matter how competent, can accurately predict when any convicted person can be released with a reasonable
prospect of safety to the public. A trial judge is required to hear
nothing which does not bear upon the question of guilt as to the
particular charge. In many instances he does not know of a former
criminal record. It is impossible for the trial judge at the time of
sentence to determine whether conviction and incarceration will
bring about true repentance and a desire to abstain from law
violation.
The prisoner's former life and his social history is frequently
a closed book to the trial judge. If, in the trial of a case, he used a
social service history report or gathered facts and circumstances
regarding the prisoner that were not admissible as evidence during
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the trial, and the sentence were based upon this knowledge, it is
probable the case would be reversed for error. But even if the
judge had complete information and a social diagnosis of the
offender, it would be difficult for him to fix an accurate sentence.
The effect of imprisonment is not the same on different men. One
man might be sufficiently adjusted to be paroled within a comparatively short time; in the case of another individual, it might
take years; in the case of still another he may never be qualified
for release.
The question of his later behavior in prison could not be known
to the judge. As a rule the trial court has little, if any, knowledge
of the prisoner's mental condition and he could not know of any
changes that might occur in the prisoner's mental condition during
incarceration.
In passing upon the question of whether or not a prisoner
should be paroled or the length of time he should remain in the
penitentiary, many factors are and must be considered. There must
be known the crime, the facts and circumstances surrounding it,
the statement of the trial judge and state's attorney, whether or not
the crime was attended with kidnapping, shooting, attempted shooting, violence, attempted violence, or other brutality. But this alone
is not sufficient. There must also be known the convicted person's
previous criminal record, the nature of previous crimes committed
and the facts and circumstances surrounding the previous crimes,
whether or not the prisoner is a repeater of the same character of
offense, the past life of the prisoner, his former reputation and work
record, his conduct and work record while in prison, the reports of
the mental health officers, the prison physician, the sociologist
and actuary and the investigator, the adequacy of his punishment.
The Parole Board must further ascertain the probabilities of his
never again violating the law, the nature of the employment offered,
the character and responsibility of the proposed sponsor, and the
home to which it is intended the prisoner shall go, together with all
other matters that in any way bear upon the question of the public
welfare, as well as that of the prisoner. All these are strongly
determining factors. As can be readily seen, many of these factors
can not be made known to the trial judge at the time he must impose sentence.
One of the very forceful objections to determinate sentences by a
trial court was the lack of uniformity in the penalties imposed for
crimes of the same class. The records under such a law show an
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astounding incongruity of sentences. For the same crime where the
facts and circumstances are substantially the same, the sentence is
frequently dependent upon the section of the State from which the
prisoner happens to come and the judge or jury before whom he
was tried. It is not unusual under a determinate sentence system
for a first offender to receive a severe sentence and a second offender
a comparatively light one. As a matter of fact, one of the prisoners
now incarcerated in the penitentiary under a determinate sentence
is serving a sentence of ninety-nine (99) years for a first offense.
Another, with a previous record of incarceration in three penitentiaries, received a sentence of four years for the same offense under
very similar circumstances. The records contain a large number
of instances of a like character, where determinate sentences were
imposed.
There is a popular impression fostered by newspaper stories,
that under a parole system, convicted persons are released earlier
than if they had received a definite sentence of years. As a matter
of fact, the contrary is true. It can be shown conclusively that
persons convicted of crime under our parole system serve longer
sentences on the average than are imposed by trial judges where
the latter are permitted to imprison for definite periods.
Persons on parole do commit crimes. They would also commit
them if they had been released under a definite sentence. However, there is less chance of turning loose upon society an habitual
criminal under a parole system than under a system where the trial
court fixes the imprisonment. The ideal of course would be reached,
if a Parole Board, in attempting the exceedingly difficult task of
charting future human conduct, could achieve perfection.
The parole system is immeasurably superior than permitting
the judge to fix definite sentences, because unconditional release
at the end of such imprisonment does not permit any supervision
of the convicted person after he leaves the penitentiary. A vast
majority of enlightened and experienced public opinion subscribes
to this view. " Civic organizations do not favor House Bill No. 382
because it is well known that it would vitiate our indeterminate
sentence law and would tend to scrap our parole law.
The views I have expressed here are not new. I have asserted
them before. They heretofore have been stated by men and women
who have devoted their lives to the study of penology and have had
wide practical experience with the subject. The principle of this
bill is opposed to the considered judgment of the great majority of
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criminologists and the overwhelming portion of laymen who have
given time and study to it. Many trial judges with great experience
in criminal cases, the Chicago Citizens' Association, the Chicago
Bar Association, The American Prison Association, The American
Parole Association, The Chicago Crime Commission, The City Club,
The Chicago Association of Commerce, and many other civic organizations, the Presidents of the large universities and the Deans of
the leading law colleges of our State, the Illinois Citizens' Committee on Parole made up of officials from forty of the leading civic
organizations and countless other prominent citizens have communicated to me their inflexible opposition to this bill and have
urged me to veto it. They condemn it as a backward step in our
system of punishment for crime.
Fortified by the corroborative opinion of these and others, forward-looking citizens and practical students and experts in criminology, I am thoroughly convinced that the principles embodied in
House Bill No. 382 are unsound and for that reason, I veto and
withhold my approval from it.

